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Abstract1
What drove the transition from small-scale human societies centred on kinship and per-2
sonal exchange, to large-scale societies comprising cooperation and division of labour3
among untold numbers of unrelated individuals? We propose that the unique human4
capacity to negotiate institutional rules that coordinate social actions was a key driver5
of this transition. By creating institutions, humans have been able to move from the6
default “Hobbesian” rules of the “game of life”, determined by physical/environmental7
constraints, into self-created rules of social organisation where cooperation can be indi-8
vidually advantageous even in large groups of unrelated individuals. Examples include9
rules of food sharing in hunter-gatherers, rules for the usage of irrigation systems in10
agriculturalists, property rights, and systems for sharing reputation between medieval11
traders. Successful institutions create rules of interaction that are self-enforcing, pro-12
viding direct benefits both to individuals that follow them, and to individuals that13
sanction rule breakers. Forming institutions requires shared intentionality, language,14
and other cognitive abilities largely absent in other primates. We explain how co-15
operative breeding likely selected for these abilities early in the Homo lineage. This16
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2allowed anatomically modern humans to create institutions that transformed the self-17
reliance of our primate ancestors into the division of labour of large-scale human social18
organisation.19
Keywords: cooperation; institutions; division of labour; human evolution; trade; punish-20
ment21
Introduction22
Life on earth has undergone a series of major evolutionary transitions in which individuals at23
a lower level of biological organisation came together to form higher-level units [1]. Examples24
include replicating molecules coming together to form protocells, single-celled individuals25
evolving into multicellular organisms, and solitary insects transitioning into eusocial colonies.26
The final transition proposed by Maynard Smith & Szathma´ry [1] is the origin of human27
societies. Yet while the other major evolutionary transitions are starting to become well28
understood [2, 3], there is a lack of a cohesive theory that can explain the transition from29
primate social organisation based on kinship and personal exchange to human societies with30
large-scale impersonal exchange and division of labour between unrelated individuals.31
Human societies do indeed largely meet the criteria for a major evolutionary transition32
[3]. For example, just as epigenetic inheritance (a novel inheritance mechanism) allows the33
cells in a multicellular organism to differentiate and profit from a division of labour, so lan-34
guage (a novel cultural inheritance mechanism) allows human individuals to coordinate and35
specialise in different tasks, and so also to profit from a division of labour. Similarly, while36
by most measures a multicellular organism is more complex than a single cell, so human37
chiefdoms are more complex than hunter-gatherer bands in terms of the number of hierar-38
chical levels of organisation [4]. And just as multicellular organisms with division of labour39
and sterile somatic cells gradually evolved from single-celled ancestors, so the phylogenies40
of language vocabulary trees point to states evolving gradually from chiefdoms, which41
in turn evolved gradually from hunter-gatherer macro-bands and tribes [4].42
We propose to subdivide the major transition to large-scale human societies into four43
distinct, smaller transitions (Fig. 1). (1) The origin of the human hunter-gatherer niche,44
characterised by large but hard to acquire food packages, allomaternal care, and egalitarian45
social structure. (2) The origin of language, a novel unlimited inheritance system that46
3strongly facilitates cumulative cultural evolution and negotiation between individuals. (3)47
The Neolithic revolution, which involved the shift to agricultural and sedentary populations48
with hierarchical social organisation. (4) The origin of states, where interactions regularly49
occur between non-kin who may never meet again.50
We will assume that the first transition, from a largely vegetarian primate living in fission-51
fusion societies in woodland landscapes, to a savannah-living partly carnivorous cooperative52
hunter type of living, was made possible by changes in social organisation not unlike those53
seen in other lineages that ended up adopting a combination of cooperative breeding and54
hunting (e.g. [5]). Our focus here, then, is on explaining the transitions in social organisation55
subsequent to the emergence of language. Current estimates place the origin of modern-like56
language at either less than 100 kya or at around 500 kya, with the older date being the57
most plausible [6].58
From an economic point of view, the major transition is from an initial state59
of autarky in which group members do not typically exchange resources with60
each other, to one of catallaxy where there is extreme division of labour and hence in-61
terdependence between group members. In non-human primate social systems, each62
individual produces itself most of the resources and technology it needs to sur-63
vive and reproduce. By contrast, while hunter-gatherer individuals can typically64
still each produce their own technology, they are reliant on the sharing of food65
with other individuals to survive. Finally, in large-scale human societies indi-66
viduals rely on trade with non-kin for nearly all of their vital resources, and67
an individual will not always itself possesses the entire knowledge necessary to68
produce any single piece of technology.69
Here we develop the hypothesis that the human capacity to form institutions was a70
key driver of the transition to large-scale societies (and may indeed be necessary for their71
formation). Institutions (sensu [7]) are human-devised mechanisms for generating the rules72
of social interactions . Through communication and negotiation, humans can transform the73
rules of their “game of life”. The game of life depends on two kinds of constraints. The first74
kind consists of exogenous biotic and abiotic factors that cannot be changed by individuals at75
the time they are interacting [7, 8]. These factors include the laws of physics and the current76
environment, which comprises for example the current total resource endowment and the77
individuals’ state of technology. The second type of constraints are behavioural in nature and78
4so can potentially be modified by the individuals themselves [7, 8]. This includes restraining79
or expanding behavioural options. By creating institutions, individuals can change the rules80
aspect of their social interactions, thereby increasing some possibilities without foreclosing81
others, and potentially tipping the balance from a situation where defection is individually82
advantageous into one where it pays to cooperate [9, 10, 8, 11, 12]. As we will discuss below,83
theoretical work in economics has formally demonstrated conditions under which this can84
occur even in arbitrarily large groups of unrelated individuals where participants meet very85
infrequently [10, 11, 12].86
Humans can create these institutions because they possess various cognitive87
features that are lacking in other primates, and that are necessary to devise and88
enforce institutional rules. These include shared intentionality, strong inhibitory89
control, and a willingness to seek out mutual opportunities. We explain below90
how these skills evolved as a result of the adoption of cooperative breeding early91
in the Homo lineage. Once in place, they could then be co-opted for institution92
formation.93
In the remainder of this paper, we first define the term institution more precisely, before94
delineating their costs and benefits, and discussing the cognitive prerequisites necessary for95
their evolution. We then discuss how the institutional-path hypothesis can explain the key96
steps of social evolution from hunter-gatherers with language to large-scale states.97
Institutions98
What is an institution?99
In general the outcome(s) of an individual’s behaviour, in terms of its fitness consequences100
and/or material rewards, depends upon the behaviour of other individuals as well as on101
exogenous biotic and abiotic factors. In game theory [13, 14], a game form defines the102
behavioural options – the “strategies” – available to each individual, and the relationship103
between strategies and outcomes. The game form thus specifies the rules of social interac-104
tions or, in other words, the “rules of the game”, which is usually and casually referred to105
in evolutionary biology as a game. More particularly, in game theory, a game consists of a106
game form and the preferences of individuals over alternative outcomes, and thus determines107
5equilibrium strategies [13, 14]. In evolutionary biology, strategies are often (but not always)108
assumed to be genetically or culturally inherited, in which case it is directly the evolutionary109
process and not the preferences that determine equilibrium strategies.110
When individuals can communicate with each other, and when the strategies consist of111
messages, a game form is often called a mechanism [7]. We follow Hurwicz [7] in considering112
that an institution is a mechanism whose outcome is a game form. The hallmark of an113
institution is a sequence of at least two sets of social interactions:114
1. Active genesis of institutional rules through communication and bargaining by the115
individuals in a group (or subset thereof).116
2. Economic interactions whose outcomes are material, and which are affected by the117
institutional rules.118
An institution thus consists of a political game form, which determines the rules of the119
subsequent economic interactions (Fig. 2). These two types of interaction are likely to take120
place on very different timescales. In particular, the political game form is likely to be121
played much less frequently than the economic game form. For example, the economic game122
form will likely be played many times in a single generation, while the institutional rules123
may only change once every several generations. The rules of the political game will also124
themselves be set by rules generated by another game form, referred to as a “constitutional”125
game form by Ostrom [15, p. 59]. This constitutional game form will in turn be played126
even less frequently. Finally, the rules of the constitutional game form will themselves be127
set by a ”meta-constitutional” game form, but this series of rule-generating game forms128
eventually begins with the unchangeable rules of the biophysical world, and terminates with129
the economic game form that generates material payoffs [15]. Because our focus is on the130
distinction between generating rules versus playing the economic game form, for simplicity131
we consider only one political game form and one economic game form.132
A more all-encompassing and formal definition of institutions than that given above ex-133
ists (most notably the one by Hurwicz [7, p. 128]), but for our purposes it is enough to see134
an institution as a mechanism involving communication whose outcomes are rules of inter-135
actions. Non-linguistic animals are probably unable to produce institutions involving many136
individuals, even though they play economic games, because they cannot autonomously137
generate institutional rules through communication.138
6The assemblies in modern hunter-gatherers that discuss resource allocation rules or what139
would be adequate norms of behaviour provide a good example of an institution as defined140
above. We stress that the institution comprises the negotiation process as well as the141
resulting norms or rules of behaviour [7, p. 128]. This is in contrast to the cultural evolution142
literature, which equates institutions with equilibrium norms of behaviour in an economic143
game form [16], rather than with a political game form that generates rules for the economic144
game form.145
The benefits of institutions146
The formation of institutional rules can transform the “Hobbesian” rules (or default rules) of147
the game of life into different rules that lead to more cooperative outcomes, but why is this?148
Since interactions are localised, it is important to realise that social life in hominins largely149
consists of a repetition of interactions that involve coordination or cooperation problems.150
For repeated interactions, the fundamental folk theorem of game theory [13, 14, 17] tells151
us that cooperation can ultimately be sustained in an equilibrium by conditional strategies152
that respond to players’ past actions (reciprocity).153
Specifically, in an indefinitely long sequence of interactions where individuals value future154
payoffs and cannot completely hide their actions, any strategy that guarantees a payoff at155
least as great as the minimax payoff in the underlying stage game can be an equilibrium156
[13, 14, 17]. The minimax payoff is the largest payoff that an individual can receive if its157
opponent tries to minimise the individual’s payoff – in the Prisoner’s Dilemma it would be158
the payoff received when the opponent defects. Therefore, if any individual deviates from159
the equilibrium strategy, then its payoff can be reduced to the minimax payoff by its co-160
players. Consequently, it does not pay an individual to deviate from a strategy that gives161
more than its minimax payoff. This logic applies even to groups of infinitely large size where162
an individual does not interact twice with the same partner, provided that there is a way to163
transmit sufficient information about the past behaviour of partners [10, 18], i.e. reputation.164
It also applies to interactions where N -players interact simultaneously [19], such as repeated165
collective action problems.166
There are potentially three kinds of issues that can limit the application of the folk167
theorem, each of which can be addressed by institutions. The first potential problem stems168
7from the fact that there are infinitely many cooperative equilibria [17, 20]. Many of these169
equilibria will give payoffs that are hardly any better than the minimax payoff, while others170
will result in much greater payoffs. If individuals act independently, then they have no means171
to guarantee that they will coordinate on an equilibrium that gives high individual payoffs,172
and are likely to settle on the “default equilibrium” determined by the default Hobbesian173
rules of interactions (Fig. 3). Institutions can resolve this problem, because they provide a174
means for individuals to amalgamate dispersed information about resources and wants, and175
hence coordinate their actions to reach an equilibrium that gives higher payoffs than the176
default equilibrium (Fig. 3). By devising rules of interactions they settle on an equilibrium,177
transforming the social contract (in the sense of [17, 20]) from one that gives only the payoff178
of the Hobbesian equilibrium, to one where the benefits of cooperation are achieved.179
The second issue is that individuals need to value future payoffs, and the game needs180
to be indefinitely repeated. Institutional rules can help to make these conditions hold. For181
example, Casari [21] describes the development of institutional rules to govern the use of182
common agriculture land in the Italian Alps, between 1200-1800 AD. The rules which most183
villages ended up adopting tied families and their future descendants into the group, by184
requiring that the sale or purchase of rights to use the communal land was subject to a185
majority vote amongst the other villagers. This ensured that individuals would then care186
about their future payoffs, and that there was no simple way to end the game.187
The third issue is that individuals need to have sufficient information about the past188
behaviour of other individuals, a problem which becomes all the more pressing as group size189
increases. Institutional rules can help to alleviate these problems by facilitating the spread190
of information between group members. For example, extant groups managing common-191
pool resources from irrigation systems to shared grazing lands make agreements to appoint192
individuals to act as monitors, and regularly hold assemblies of all group members to share193
information [9, 21]. Institutional rules that resolve social dilemmas also typically centralised194
repositories for storing information about the reputation of group members, which was195
common for merchants in medieval Europe [10, 12]. The right institutional rules, then, can196
create an environment in which the Folk Theorem can apply [22].197
Institutional rules are typically not imposed externally, but are the result of a political198
game form. Experiments have repeatedly found that individuals placed in social dilemmas199
and allowed to communicate achieve better outcomes than if they are not allowed to com-200
8municate [23]. Those using communication both to agree on a joint investment strategy201
and choose their own sanctioning system achieve results close to the group’s optimum ([23],202
see also [24]). Field studies have illustrated how institutional rules, designed by resource203
users themselves, allow for the self-organised management of irrigation [25, 26, 27], fishing,204
and harvesting systems [9]. For example, in the Spanish huerta irrigation systems, institu-205
tional rules specify how much water each user may take at a given time, how responsibilities206
for maintenance of the system are shared, and what the sanctions are for individuals that207
break the rules. These rules are not imposed externally but are created by assemblies of the208
irrigators themselves, and indeed have been for a thousand years [9].209
Critically, and contrary to cultural group selection arguments (e.g. [28, 29, 30]), insti-210
tutional rules in these situations create a game form in which monitoring and sanctioning211
are not altruistic (sensu evolutionary biology [31]). Rather, field studies have demonstrated212
that successful institutional rules create conditions that provide direct benefits (sensu evolu-213
tionary biology [31]) to individuals that actively monitor and enforce them [10, 12, 9, 22, 32].214
As such, in contrast to altruistic punishment [33, 29], they do not require high genetic or215
cultural relatedness between group members.216
For example, Ostrom describes how extant small-scale societies incentive group members217
to monitor each other, by allowing individuals that discover a cheater to keep a proportion of218
the fine levied on that cheater [9]. And as an example in larger-scale societies, in medieval219
Europe the Law Merchant system of institutional rules was developed, where individuals220
could pay a cost to register non-cooperative acts by their partner with a judge. They could221
also pay a cost to query the system to see whether their trading partner had any disputes222
registered against them before transacting [10, 12]. Judges could impose a fine on cheaters,223
but had no means to force individuals to pay this fine. Nevertheless, if a fine was imposed224
then it was in the trader’s own interests to pay it in order to maintain a good reputation with225
the Law Merchant, and so be able to reap the benefits of cooperation with other individuals226
in future. Consequently, this system of sanctioning was self-enforcing, even though traders227
could not be compelled to pay a fine, and had to finance the Law Merchant system themselves228
[10].229
9The costs of institutions230
Creating self-enforcing institutional rules is a costly process. First, there are costs to setting231
up a self-enforcing system of monitoring and sanctioning, such as paying judges in the Law232
Merchant system. Second, time and energy must be spent on negotiating the rules. While233
this can be done in face-to-face discussions after sunset in hunter-gatherer groups, negoti-234
ation becomes much more costly as group size increases. Indeed, it cannot be overstated235
how difficult it is to agree on something in a group. Arrow’s impossibility theorem [34]236
says that there is no satisfactory way of making social decisions once individuals have suffi-237
ciently different preferences. As a result, institutional arrangements that need a high level238
of consensus betwee/n group members may be inherently unstable whenever individuals’239
endowments and allegiances shift over time, or when there is a turnover of players. Finally,240
some individuals may exert disproportional influence in the political interactions, driving241
the creation of rules that favour themselves at the expense of others. The cooperation and242
coordination achieved under the institutional rules needs to provide sufficient benefits to243
offset all of these costs, and thus improve on the payoff from the Hobbesian equilibrium244
(Fig. 3). Nevertheless, the fact that we see cooperation-promoting institutions in the real245
world implies that this condition can in principle be met.246
The uniqueness of institutions in humans247
We emphasise here the uniquely human genesis of institutional rules: the explicit and coordi-248
nated construction of group-wide rules that regulate social interactions and that are enforced249
by other group members. This contrasts in a fundamental way to the usual mechanisms for250
social interactions considered in evolutionary biology. Other organisms can indeed condition251
their behaviour on the actions of other individuals (e.g. reciprocity), and they can modify252
their environment over time (niche construction, [35]). Other animals also perform social253
learning, imitating traditions of other group members such as bird songs or techniques to254
open nuts. But crucially, we are aware of no other species that over one individual’s lifetime255
can construct arbitrary rules to regulate social activity, and then enforce these rules by co-256
ordinated sanctioning (see also [36] for a similar argument about the uniqueness of human257
culture).258
For example, consider the institutional rules of marriage, the details of which are par-259
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ticular to any one society. At first sight, the reproductive strategy of monogamy adopted260
by many animals may seem to be the same. But this is not so, because the institutional261
rules of marriage regulate what counts as marriage, what the necessary preconditions for it262
to occur are (e.g. the payment of dowries), who may marry who, how a marriage may be263
terminated, etc. These rules are necessarily recognised and followed by many individuals,264
and violations are enforced by coordinated sanctioning. In other words, they define what is265
normative, and they change the rules of the social game by changing the mapping between266
individual strategies and the corresponding outcomes, i.e. the payoff matrix. By contrast,267
monogamy in the animal world is simply an individual unilateral reproductive strategy that268
is not regulated by rules and enforced by societal sanctioning, and so which does not change269
the rules of the underlying social game.270
The cognitive requirements of institutions271
It is difficult to see how individuals could play the political game form without certain272
cognitive faculties that are unique to humans. Institutions involve individuals bargaining273
over rules to structure their social interactions. This means that they first need to be able to274
foresee alternative social contracts, and then communicate and negotiate over them in order275
to improve over the default Hobbesian rules. This requires at least three types of advanced276
cognitive features. (1) To devise alternative rules of interactions, individuals need to be277
able to create virtual worlds. This requires planning, imagination, causal understanding,278
large working memory, and the ability to anticipate future rewards. (2) To communicate and279
bargain efficiently over their rules of interactions, individuals need language and a motivation280
to seek out information and knowledge, have shared intentionality, and a fully developed281
theory of mind. (3) To reach consensus, individuals need a strong willingness to seek out282
mutual opportunities, as well as have strong inhibitory control.283
These abilities are only partially present in other primates. Why is this? After all, other284
primates have large brains [37] and relatively well developed cognitive faculties. The an-285
swer is that many of the traits require at least some degree of prosocial motivations. Proso-286
cial motivations are lacking in extant great apes, from which we can infer that287
they were also lacking in the common ancestor of the great apes and Homo. In288
the next section, we present a hypothesis for why prosocial motivations evolved289
in our lineage, and hence why our lineage evolved a social cognition that could290
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later be co-opted for the formation of institutions.291
From primate autarky to human catallaxy292
The hunter-gatherer niche before language and institutions293
Elements of the hunter-gatherer, or forager, niche were gradually assembled over the past294
2 million years or so, but details necessarily remain sketchy. Because language must have295
affected this niche (see below), we will try to reconstruct what it looked like before language296
arose, based on comparative evidence and on the archaeological and fossil records.297
It is known that by the time good documentation of Homo erectus is found, at ca. 1.8298
million years ago, the basic elements of hunting and gathering were in place [38]. We can299
infer aspects of the social system [39], including bonding among males (collective defence300
against large carnivores and subsequent collective acquisition of meat) and male-female301
friendships (as found in primates in very large groups, e.g. [40]). Large meat packages302
inevitably meant wider sharing, including with females and immatures. The latter would303
have increasing difficulty supporting themselves, given the increasing reliance on technology304
or endurance running, and thus probably required energy inputs from others. Finally, their305
large brain size, well above the so-called grey ceiling for hominoids [41], suggests energy306
inputs for reproducing females. In other words, Homo erectus showed many elements of307
extensive allomaternal care [5], i.e. cooperative breeding.308
Comparative studies show that cooperative breeding changes the psychology309
of primates, and indeed other mammals such as elephants and African wild dogs,310
when compared to their non-cooperatively-breeding sister taxa [42]. These stud-311
ies imply that cooperative breeding selects for a high social tolerance and proso-312
cial motivations, leading to a marked increase in socio-cognitive abilities [42, 43].313
What is unique in Homo is that cooperative breeding and the consequent proso-314
cial psychology were added on top of an already existing large-brained ape-like315
cognitive system inherited from our earlier hominin (australopithecine) ances-316
tors. This created the potential for a more advanced social cognition than that317
seen in other cooperatively breeding species. One especially pertinent feature318
of an ape cognitive system is an ability to understand mental states in other319
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individuals. In great apes this ability seems to only be used in competitive con-320
texts [42]. But when prosocial motivations co-evolved with cooperative breeding321
in the Homo lineage, this existing ability to grasp mental states could start to322
be used in cooperative contexts. Ultimately, this culminated in the evolution323
of shared intentionality [42], i.e. the sharing of psychological states between324
individuals. Shared intentionality in turn underlies many of the other cognitive325
prerequisites for institution formation, including the use of language to share326
information [44].327
Hunter-gatherers after the advent of language328
The origin of language is a complicated and well-studied area, which we do not address329
directly here. However, we note that once it evolved, language had two key consequences330
for hunter-gatherer social evolution. First, language made teaching more effective, which331
provided more scope for cumulative cultural evolution and hence the development of new332
technologies [45, 46]. Second, once in place language enabled individuals to negotiate their333
rules of social interactions; that is, to start create institutions for the first time. These334
two elements came together to produce greater cooperative division of labour among post-335
language hunter-gatherers.336
With the advent of new complex technologies, such as poison-tipped arrows, nets, and337
traps, it became possible for individuals to hunt large game in much smaller groups than338
before. Because hunting large game is inherently unpredictable, having multiple hunting339
parties within a social unit would provide benefits to wider food sharing as an insurance340
scheme. Even the best hunters benefit from sharing because this reduces the variance in341
their own and their offspring’s daily calorific intake [47]. The improvements in safety and342
hunting ability led to the break-up of the old group into smaller subgroups, now called bands343
or camps. But crucially the reputational effects of language allowed bonds to remain strong344
among camps of the same community, as shown by frequent moves between them. And345
increasing returns to scale would provide an advantage to sharing with a larger number of346
individuals, for example by allowing individuals to overproduce food items that they found347
easy to obtain and exchanging them for other items. Thus, fewer hunters per party supported348
by a sharing system would potentially massively reduce variance in an individual’s yield [48].349
Language made it possible for the sharing networks to become larger and therefore more350
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stable.351
Anthropological studies have shown that individuals in extant hunter-gatherer groups352
consistently devise and use institutional rules to regulate this kind of food sharing. Indeed,353
extant hunter-gatherers spend much of their time discussing rules of sharing and gossiping354
about violations of these [47]. In other words, they negotiate institutional rules and en-355
force these themselves. Examples includes rules that specify who receives what part of a356
kill and what quantity [36, 49], with defectors being punished by a variety of means from357
public ridicule through to ostracism and execution [50]. While some other primates do358
practise some degree of food sharing, they do not have non-dyadic systems of359
food sharing which are regulated and enforced by impartial rules that apply to360
everyone in the group [48]. This suggests that institutional rules are necessary361
to regulate such systems of sharing [47], and hence that the supporting institu-362
tional rules co-evolved with extended food-sharing in hunter-gatherers after the363
advent of language.364
Hill [36] gives many more examples of institutional rules in extant hunter-gatherer soci-365
eties. These include rules concerning access to mating partners within the groups (prohi-366
bitions and prescriptions on the basis of age, kin, or ritual membership), polygyny (degree367
allowed and who may practice it), regulation of violent conflict within and between groups,368
and rules regulating political power (rules of turn-taking in discussions, and rules govern-369
ing who will be the leader for different social activities). Institutional rules also affect life370
history, by specifying who must give resources to juveniles.371
During the Upper Paleolithic, we also see the emergence of long-distance trade and372
division of labour beyond food sharing. Evidence for this includes the remains of materials373
that had been transported hundreds of kilometres from their origins, and the development374
of new tools that were specialised in performing specific tasks [51]. Trade would have been375
strongly favoured by the presence of institutions, because already back then it required376
a mechanism by which individuals could make faithful promises to invest in labour that377
would only become useful when the finished product was exchanged. While doing this, the378
individual would produce less food, which would necessitate the pre-existence of rules for379
food sharing. Finally, the efficiency of long-distance trade would have been greatly enhanced380
by an institution for using some type of (pre-numismatic) money. The existence of art and381
other forms of symbolism suggest that Upper Palaeolithic humans had the cognitive abilities382
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to do this [51].383
An important question concerns how institutional rules were formed in Palaeolithic384
hunter-gatherers. In other words, what form did the political interactions that generated385
these rules take? Modern hunter-gatherer groups spend much time discussing institutional386
rules and violations of these around the camp fire after sunset [50]. Furthermore, observa-387
tions of these groups show egalitarian political interactions. Individuals typically take turns388
to give their opinions during group discussions [50]. The role of leaders seems to be to help389
the group to reach a consensus, rather than to force their own opinion upon others, or to390
benefit materially. Moreover, ethnographic [50] evidence suggests, and archaeological [52]391
evidence confirms, that status was not hereditary in these ancient mobile hunter-gatherers.392
This egalitarianism likely evolved and was maintained by a combination of high degrees393
of social interdependence in obtaining and defending resources, and lethal weapons that394
reduced the effects of physical differences in strength between would-be dominants and sub-395
ordinates [53]. Moreover, it would be difficult for any one individual to monopolise meat396
from large game. Thus, although each individual should be expected to try to craft insti-397
tutional rules that benefit itself, the egalitarian social structure would have prevented any398
one individual from being able to benefit itself too much at the expense of the rest of the399
group. Consequently, the political game was likely to take the form of a mechanism that400
aggregated the preferences of all group members [54] without resulting in too much dissent.401
The origin of agriculture, large social groups, and hierarchy402
The origin of agriculture was likely made possible by many factors [55], including the sta-403
bilisation of the climate in the Holocene. However, successful agriculture would have neces-404
sitated the expansion of the domain of regulation by group institutions. It would require405
new property rights, to ensure that an individual could not simply have his plants, animals,406
land, or stored food taken by others [56]. Agriculture would also require institutional rules407
to prevent the overexploitation of land and other common pool resources [9, 21]. Groups408
would also face new social dilemmas brought about by new, shared technology, such as the409
construction and usage of irrigation systems [57]. The existence of institutions therefore410
placed humans in a unique position to benefit from agriculture.411
It is plausible that institutions aimed at solving these problems co-evolved with the de-412
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mographic expansion of human groups brought about by agriculture. If cooperation prob-413
lems were solved, then larger group sizes could potentially benefit individuals through both414
economies of scale (increasing returns in material payoff as a function of population size,415
[58]) and economies of scope (increasing returns in material payoff due to variety, not size,416
[59]). The logic of this has been demonstrated in a formal model of the co-evolution of417
demography with institutions to regulate irrigation [60]. The results were that groups with418
institutional rules that successfully solved collective action problems grew to a larger size,419
and spread their institutional rules to other groups through excess migration.420
However, as humans shifted to intensive modes of subsistence the political game form421
itself started to change [61]. With the advent of storage technologies, it became possible for422
some individuals to start to build up a surplus of resources and form patrilineal clans for423
their effective defence. Permanent agriculture, especially irrigation systems, would have tied424
individuals to their group, making it hard to escape a despotic leader. The result was that425
agriculture triggered a shift from egalitarianism back to despotic social structure. Despotic426
leaders that commanded surpluses of resources would then be able to influence institutions427
for their own good at the expense of other group members, in a way that they could not428
have done previously in an egalitarian structure. For example, leaders could dominate the429
political game form and skew the rules in their favour by enforcing (with coalitional support)430
what proportion of surplus resources from irrigation farming they could keep for themselves431
rather than share with the rest of the group [62, 63]. Consequently, the shift to intensive432
food production heralded a transition to coercive and non-egalitarian institutions, or so-433
called extractive institutions [64].434
The origin of states and large-scale markets435
Agriculture ultimately led to the emergence of multiple levels of hierarchical organisation –436
states. In a state the individuals just below the leader in the hierarchy each specialise in just437
a subset of the tasks of the ruler [65]. The creation of specialised authority roles represents438
a new institution, i.e. a new political game form that determines the rules of the economic439
interactions of commoners.440
The archaeological evidence shows that the first states arose by the aggregation of previ-441
ously independent groups, rather than by one group simply expanding in size and displacing442
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its neighbours [66]. At least two types of between-group interactions are implicated in443
driving this aggregation: warfare and trade [66]. The role of warfare is quite intuitive: ag-444
gregation can happen by one polity forcing another to become subordinate to it. The role445
of trade is often seen as creating ties between chiefs, through the procurement and exchange446
of prestige goods (e.g. [67]; see [68] for a review). However, there is also evidence that447
staple goods were traded over long distances during the Neolithic [69]. Indeed, institutional448
rules regulated trade during the Neolithic, and prices even followed market rules of supply449
and demand [68]. Trade would be most reliable, and have lower transaction costs [70], with450
those others that were playing by the same institutional rules. Institutions could therefore451
provide a pressure for groups to aggregate into a larger polity in order to reap the gains of452
economies of scale and scope from trade.453
In modern states, division of labour is so pronounced that individuals are critically de-454
pendent on others outside their family and close friendship circles for food, as well as for455
protection from the myriads of hazards encountered during their lifespan. These vital ele-456
ments for reproduction and survival are often supplied by decentralised competitive markets.457
This arrangement results in a “mutual dependence among strangers” [71] where there is a458
remarkable level of trust among interacting individuals, which appears to be as uniquely459
human as language.460
The central problem behind the functioning of any market, and more generally any461
large-scale society, is that no one has complete information [72]. The rewards of competitive462
exchange thus seem unachievable without institutional rules that guarantee at least secure463
property rights, and that enforce the various structural characteristics of information flow in464
markets [17]. Furthermore, not all markets can be efficient because resource allocations made465
at the individual level often result in externalities, i.e. the effects of an individual’s action466
can spill over into the environment and negatively affect other individuals, creating a tragedy467
of the commons situation [73]. This forces groups to design institutional rules that regulate468
any spillover on the environment, such as the medieval Law Merchant that facilitated trade469
between strangers by spreading information about their past behaviour [10]. Indeed, the470
quality of institutional rules has been proposed as being the single main determinant of471
whether modern nations will fail or succeed. Acemoglu & Robinson [64] distinguish between472
institutional rules that are inclusive, meaning that they provide incentives to individuals473
that reward them for their productivity, in contrast to extractive rules that reward only a474
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few individuals and that fail to adequately protect property rights.475
Discussion476
Institutions, the individually devised communication processes that produce rules to struc-477
ture social interactions, are evolved (extended) phenotypes that fundamentally rely on lan-478
guage. They are key determinants of, and may be necessary to explain, the last major479
evolutionary transition.480
In economics, institutions are often thought of as being formed by individuals with un-481
bounded levels of cognition; that is, individuals following the neoclassical rational choice482
assumptions [70, chapter 3]. But preferences for forming institutions and institutional rules483
can also evolve by processes of cultural evolution [60]. Consequently, institutions can be484
formed by individuals that have only bounded rationality (like probably any hominoid),485
as long as institution formation increases an individual’s own payoff, or their inclusive payoff486
or fitness. Our hypothesis for the emergence of large-scale societies relies on self-created and487
self-enforcing institutional rules, which regardless of the exact level of rationality/cognition488
of individuals involved, provide direct benefits from cooperation and coordination. Un-489
der self-enforcing institutional rules cooperation, and monitoring and sanctioning, are not490
opposed by within-group selection, and are adaptive at the individual level.491
There are at least three alternative hypotheses for the evolutionary origin492
of large-scale human societies. The first rests on individuals performing biased493
social learning, especially conformity-biased learning, whereby they tend to imi-494
tate the most frequent behaviours within their group. This creates high cultural495
relatedness within groups, and thus enables cultural group selection [74]. Al-496
though the conditions under which this really works remain unclear [75, 76, 77],497
it implicitly assumes a very low level of rationality, because individuals are as-498
sumed to be unable to compute when it would actually be advantageous to499
express shirking behaviours [78]. Consequently, in contrast to the institutional-500
path hypothesis, the biased-social-learning hypothesis entails that cooperation501
is often maladaptive at the individual level. Yet although experiments show502
that human infants develop a propensity for unconditional helping by the age503
of two, by the age of three they start to become influenced by the past be-504
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haviour of their partners [79]. In other words, as they develop children do505
start to take account of expected benefit when deciding whether to cooperate.506
Such individually-beneficial cooperation is expected under the institutional-path507
hypothesis. Interestingly, this is the same age at which children start to norma-508
tively enforce the rules of artificial games in the laboratory [80].509
Moreover, because the cultural evolution literature has essentially ignored the510
possibility of humans playing a political game, it has implicitly assumed that511
the rules of the economic game form cannot be changed by a process operating512
within groups. As such, the cultural evolution literature has concluded that rules513
can only change by a slow and external process of between-group competition,514
rather than being variable in the short term through internal negotiation. But515
this conclusion does not fit will with the large brains and advanced planning516
and negotiation skills of our species.517
The second hypothesis presupposes the formation of coercive hierarchy, which results518
from strong asymmetries in physical strength or power within groups (Fig. 1). Coalitions519
of powerful individuals (elites) are able to coerce others when surpluses, as produced by520
agriculture, are large enough to be exploited. They may increase this coercion as groups521
expand in size through monopolising resources gained through conflict with other groups522
[81, 82]. This ultimately results in elites creating coercive states through conquest [83].523
Under this hypothesis, individuals may still behave in their self-interest when coerced, but524
the social equilibrium will be far from a group-efficient outcome.525
The third hypothesis (the “interdependence hypothesis”) is based on the idea526
that cooperation in early humans was mutualistic, with individuals becoming527
highly dependant on each other through the scavenging of the carcasses of large528
game, which later extended into cooperative hunting [84]. This required the529
development of shared intentionality, and then other advanced socio-cognitive530
features such as language, in order to ensure successful coordination in high risk531
Stag-Hunt game situations. The high interdependence of individuals, combined532
with the possibility of partner choice, provided an incentive for individuals to use533
reputation when deciding whether to cooperate with an individual. However,534
this kind of cooperation was threatened as group size expanded, party due to the535
problem of knowing the reputation of other group members. It is hypothesised536
19
that this problem lead to the adoption of group-wide norms and conventions,537
and symbolic markers as proxies for reputation [84].538
There are clearly strong connections between all these hypotheses, and several ele-539
ments of them are not mutually exclusive. Both the biased-cultural-transmission and the540
institutional-path hypotheses rely fundamentally on cultural evolution, and thus involve541
social learning. The main difference is the conception of rationality that individuals are en-542
dowed with. Under the institutional-path hypothesis individuals are assumed to have high543
levels of cognition and rationality (see section “The cognitive requirements of institutions”),544
enough at least to respond adaptively to their social environment and reinforce individually545
beneficial actions under most circumstances. But it does not at all require conformity- or546
prestige-biased transmission. While conformity is surely important in humans and other547
primates, we also know that humans are flexible with their investment in cooperation de-548
pending upon the context [78, 85, 86], and that there is strong within-culture variation in549
the social learning strategies that individuals employ [87]. The institutional-path hypothesis550
better fits with these findings, by not requiring within-group homogeneity of behaviour or551
preferences.552
Having institutions also does not exclude hierarchy and dominance. If hierarchical com-553
mand is an efficient mode to solve economic problems as group size increases [88], then the554
voluntary creation of hierarchy and leadership is exactly what we expect to see in the long-555
run under the institutional path hypothesis. The political game form can then subsequently556
change into one of dominance, where the new leaders take advantage of the costs of resisting557
or dispersing to create institutional rules that benefit themselves at the expense of others558
[62, 63], paving the way to extractive institutions. However, coercive hierarchy seems to be559
inherently unstable [89] and costly to maintain, given the possibility for subordinates to form560
coalitions. Moreover, extant small-scale societies demonstrate that egalitarian institutions561
can resolve social dilemmas in irrigation and other agricultural problems, and often do so562
more effectively than coercive institutions [9].563
Finally, both the institutional-path and interdependence hypotheses agree564
that human cooperation was driven by direct benefits in small groups. But the565
interdependence hypothesis argues that the mechanisms supporting this must566
have broken down in large groups, leading to the use of conformity, group-wide567
norms and conventions, and symbolic markers as proxies for reputation. How-568
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ever, this hypothesis does not provide an account of how particular group-wide569
norms and conventions would be adopted. By contrast, under the institutional-570
path hypothesis institutional rules continue to provide direct benefits to coop-571
erating even in large groups, and are created by a political game form.572
We conclude that the key puzzle about large-scale human societies is not how to explain573
the existence of altruistic cooperation that is costly and fitness reducing over an individual’s574
lifetime, as has been widely suggested [90]. Instead, the puzzle lies in understanding how575
the institutional rules that provide lifetime direct benefits to cooperation and coordination576
are generated and sustained over both short and long times scales. From a theoretical577
perspective, there is a need for further modelling work on the evolution of institutional rules.578
From an empirical perspective, future work should investigate further how the cognitive579
prerequisites for creating institutions evolved, and what the exact level of rationality required580
is. It should also examine the role of the co-evolution of trade and warfare with institutions,581
and the concomitant rise of large-scale societies.582
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Figure legends803
Figure 1: Sub-transitions of the major transition from small- to large-scale human societies,804
with the major triggers for subsequent changes indicated, as well as crude estimates of the805
timing of these transitions. Solving the collective action problems inherent in large-scale806
agriculture may or may not have involved coercion depending on the society (e.g. over807
management of irrigation [25, 57, 91]). However, the surpluses provided by agriculture808
eventually led to hierarchal institutions that were prone to collapse and be reformed [89],809
culminating in the first states ca 4 kya.810
Figure 2: An institution is a mechanism of communication whose output is the rules for811
economic interactions. As such one is in the presence of a political game form, where the812
preferences of group members for institutional rules are expressed, followed by an economic813
game form. The political game form could give equal weight to the preferences of all group814
members, as in egalitarian institutions, or could give more weight to dominant individuals,815
as happened with the origin of agriculture. The result of this game is the rules (or game816
form) for the subsequent economic interactions. The economic interactions determine the817
fitness or material rewards to individuals, and may for example be a variant of a public818
goods or coordination game, or an exchange economy where goods are traded.819
Figure 3: In the absence of institutions, individuals that engage in repeated social in-820
teractions are likely to receive only the payoff corresponding to the default or Hobbesian821
equilibrium of the game of life (see also [8]). However, when group members can commu-822
nicate and negotiate an agreed coordination mechanism (i.e. create an institution), they823
can coordinate in the economic game form on an equilibrium that potentially increases their824
mutual payoff relative to the Hobbesian equilibrium (shaded area, see also [17, 20]). The825
resulting equilibrium strategies are self-enforcing, in the sense that it is both individually826
advantageous to follow them when others are doing so, and individually advantageous to827
sanction group members that do not follow them. Although this figure shows a group of828
two individuals for illustration, the size of the shaded area and thus the benefit of having829
institutions actually increases with the number of interacting individuals. This is because830
the problems of coordinating on an equilibrium without institutions increase with group size831
[88].832
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